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Durkheim’s famous study of suicide is a precursor of a large contemporary literature that investigates
the links between religion and health. The topic is particularly germane for the health of women and
of the elderly, who are much more likely to be religious. In this paper, I use data from the Gallup World
Poll to study the within and between country relationships between religiosity, age, and gender, as
well as the effects of religiosity on a range of health measures and health-related behaviors. The main
contribution of the current study comes from the coverage and richness of the data, which allow me
to use nationally representative samples to study the correlates of religion within and between more
than 140 countries using more than 300,000 observations. It is almost universally true that the elderly
and women are more religious, and I find evidence in favor of a genuine aging effect, not simply a
cohort effect associated with secularization. As in previous studies, it is not clear why women are so
much more religious than men. In most countries, religious people report better health; they say they
have more energy, that their health is better, and that they experience less pain. Their social lives and
personal behaviors are also healthier; they are more likely to be married, to have supportive friends,
they are more likely to report being treated with respect, they have greater confidence in the healthcare
and medical system and they are less likely to smoke. But these effects do not all hold in all countries,









In this paper, I use Gallup World Poll data from random national samples of individuals 
from 146 countries to investigate both the determinants of religion and its effects on 
health. These issues are especially relevant for the analysis of aging because, in almost all 
countries of the world, the elderly are more likely to report that religion is important in 
their lives. That the elderly should be more religious is predicted both by secularization 
theory, which argues that successive cohorts become less religious, at least under some 
circumstances, as well as by the economic theory of intertemporal choice and capital 
formation, which predicts that people become more religious as they grow older, Azzi 
and Ehrenberg (1975). One of the aims of this paper is to document international patterns 
of how religiosity varies with age and gender, and to produce evidence on the 
secularization versus aging stories. The second aim is to explore the relationship between 
religiosity and health. In this I follow a large contemporaneous empirical literature that 
documents that religious people typically have better health outcomes, see Koenig, 
McCullough, and Larson (2000) and McCullough and Smith (2003) who summarize 
many hundreds of studies. Most of these studies use community data, although a few use 
large national samples, as in Hummer, Rogers, Nam and Ellison’s (1999) analysis of 
religious attendance and mortality in the United States. I am aware of no analysis of 
within-country effects for a large number of countries, nor for the comparison of those 
effects between countries.  
  I shall work with a simple triangular causal structure, in which religiosity and 
religious practice are caused by income, education, age, and sex, and in which health is 
caused by religion, income, education, age and sex. I estimate these relationships   3
separately for each country, and then examine similarities and differences across 
countries, both in the national averages—essentially cross-country regressions of 
religiosity and health on national characteristics—and in the coefficients from the within-
country relationships. It is easy to think of reasons why this causal framework might be 
wrong; poor health might cause people to turn to religion, or there could be third factors 
such as rates of time preference that affect both religiosity and health. However, I do not 
believe that there is currently any credible way of distinguishing causality. So I shall 
simply follow the large majority of the literature, assuming the causal structure and 
examining the plausibility and interest of what I get within it. As we shall see, there are 
some startling differences in health outcomes and health behaviors by religiosity, and 
these patterns are worth describing and thinking about. The mechanisms that have been 
postulated in the literature—that religion is a superstition that is undermined by 
education, that wage rates or risk preferences affect religiosity and so help explain 
differences between men and women, and that the religious have healthier lives—have 
implications for the patterns of correlation in the data, and those I can examine.  
  The Gallup data cover more countries—particularly poor countries in Africa—and are 
nationally representative for more countries than previous international data such as the 
World Values Surveys, which have been widely used in previous examinations of 
religion in the world, for example by Miller and Stark (2002), Norris and Inglehart 
(2004), and Inglehart (2009). 
  The paper is organized as follows. I begin in Section 2 with a brief summary of the 
literature that is relevant to the hypotheses that we examine here, the various versions of 
the secularization hypothesis, of aging, gender, and religion, as well as accounts of the   4
ways in which religion might be good for health.  Section 3 contains a brief summary of 
the survey, including the countries covered and the questions that we use. A major 
exclusion is China, which is included in the World Poll, but without the questions on 
religiosity and religious attendance. Section 4 looks at the links between income, 
education, age, and religion; consonant with previous research, the World Poll provides 
some support for the secularization story, older people are more religious, and more 
educated better-off people are less likely to be religious. Yet there is also evidence for 
pure age effects predicted by economic theory. Section 5 looks at the links between 
religion and health, conditional on variables such as age, sex, and education that are 
linked with both.  
 
2. Religiosity, age, and other factors 
One of the dominant themes in the literature is the secularization hypothesis, the idea that 
religious belief and practice will decline over time with economic development, 
particularly with rising levels of income and education. In one form or another, the 
argument was made by David Hume, John Stuart Mill, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Sigmund 
Freud and many others, see Norris and Inglehart (2004), and McCleary and Barro (2006) 
for reviews. One extreme version of the hypothesis is that religious belief is a superstition 
that is dispelled by education. A more economic argument is given in Mill’s Utility of 
religion. Secularism, Mill argues, can provide all of the benefits of religion save one, the 
promise of eternal life. But as people become better-off in this life, they will substitute 
current for future utility, and will have less need of religion, an early argument for the 
importance of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution. Ingelhart (2008) provides an   5
argument related to Mill’s, that there are two routes to the good life, a traditional one 
through religion, with its emphasis on future bliss over present suffering, and a modern 
one, through education, higher incomes, social tolerance and political freedom. As 
countries become richer, better educated, more democratic, and freer, the need for 
religion will fall. By this argument, economic development can be expected to cause a 
decline in religious belief, but only beyond the point where “the public of a given society 
has experienced relatively high levels of economic and physical security,” Norris and 
Inglehart (2004, p. 27). 
  The secularization hypothesis has implications for the age structure of religiosity at 
any moment of time. If people’s religious beliefs are established early in life, and do not 
change, secularization implies that, in the cross-section, religiosity be higher among the 
elderly, and more so in countries where education, life time incomes, or political 
freedoms have been rapidly expanding. Countries that have had rapid economic growth 
should show larger gaps in religiosity between young and old, though if Norris and 
Inglehart are right, this will only be true among the better-off, more secure nations. 
  Religiosity may also change with age, and in particular, religion may become more 
important to people as they grow older, and their minds turn to the contemplation of the 
hereafter. Specific predictions are derived in the important paper by Azzi and Ehrenberg 
(1975), who model religious practice as a time-intensive accumulation of religious or 
sacral capital that is valuable only after death. In contrast to the accumulation of human 
capital, which pays off throughout life, so that the optimal strategy is for people to 
acquire education when they are young, the accumulation of religious capital is optimally 
postponed, with the prediction that religious practice will rise with age. Since wages are   6
lower for women than for men, and are lower for blacks than for whites, women and 
blacks should be more religious than white men, and they should accumulate religious 
capital earlier with a subsequently flatter profile than for white males. Azzi and 
Ehrenburg find support for these predictions using American data, and their model 
provides a useful lens to interpret patterns of religious activity throughout the world, both 
within countries and between them. 
  Azzi and Ehrenberg’s prediction that women should be more religious than men has 
been widely observed to be true, although there is no general agreement on the 
mechanisms involved. Miller and Hoffmann (1995) and Stark and Miller (2002) propose 
that the decision not to believe in religion is a form of risk-taking behavior—if religion is 
true, such a decision has extremely unfortunate long-term consequences—and like most 
such behaviors, is more common among men, especially young men. Although this 
account does not explain where risk attitudes come from, it provides a unified way of 
thinking about religiosity, aging, and gender. It also predicts that in religions that do not 
threaten eternal punishment for non-believers—reformed Judaism, Shintoism, Hinduism, 
Bhuddism, in contrast to Christian, Orthodox Jewish and Muslim religions—there will be 
a smaller gender gap in religiosity, as well as a less pronounced age gradient. This last is 
also consistent with Azzi and Ehrenberg’s model, since there is less need for “sacral 
capital” to fend off the fires of hell. 
  In his discussion of this paper, Jim Smith argues that women’s religiosity may be 
linked to the fact that they have the primary responsibility for child-rearing in most 
countries of the world. David Sloan Wilson (2002) has argued that religion evolved to 
confer a survival advantage to groups of believers, in which case women would have   7
responsibility for passing on beliefs from one generation to the next. If so, the gender gap 
might be expected to diminish as fertility falls, which falls foul of the evidence that the 
gender gap is largest in the richer, non-traditional societies where women have many 
options other than childbearing, Miller and Stark (2002). 
  Another important line of enquiry into secularization focuses on the role of the state, 
and on the hypothesis that state provision of social welfare and social insurance is a 
substitute for provision by organized religion, so that the latter are displaced by the 
former as the state grows over time. This line of thought leads to the examination of state 
welfare spending and religious practice, as well as to the possibility that religion is more 
important in places where risk is high—for example in agriculture—or in places where 
social safety nets are weak—for example in the US South as opposed to the US North. It 
is also possible that social security in the form of state pensions, or state provided health 
insurance—in the US focused on the elderly through Medicare—might reduce levels of 
religious participation throughout life. 
  There is also a literature on the consequences of religion, particularly the extent to 
which religious people have healthier lives. Idler and Kasl (1997) distinguish three types 
of mechanisms that they trace back to Durkheim and to Weber. These are “regulative”—
religions typically impose rules that cover not only ethical behavior, but also eating, 
drinking, and sexual activities, rules that usually promote health, “integrative”—religions 
provide networks that connect people to others who provide tangible economic and 
psychological support and in some cases, healthcare, and “interpretative”—religion 
provides meaning and understanding to life that is likely to be especially useful in times 
of suffering or stress. The empirical literature has found positive health effects of religion   8
for a wide range of conditions and diseases, for both morbidity and mortality. Much of 
the association with mortality works through the better health behaviors of the religious, 
but there is also evidence of effects even conditional on a range of social and health 
behaviors, as in Hummer et al (2009). A recent review by Michael McCullough and 
Brian Willoughby (2009), argues that religion enhances self-control; churches promote 
behaviors and beliefs that support self-regulation. Religious people absorb religious 
values into their own lives, imbuing their own long-term goals with a sacredness that 
makes them easier to attain in the face of present temptation. Of course, people who are 
born with low rates of time-preference and high self-control will also downweight the 
present relative to the future, including possibly an eternal future, and thus be more likely 
to join religions that emphasize eternal rewards in exchange for present sacrifice and self-
control. Even here, religions may reinforce innate or early-developed dispositions. 
  The literature in economics has emphasized those aspects of religion that are 
favorable or unfavorable to economic efficiency and growth, a tradition that goes back at 
least to Weber. The promotion of self-control is clearly relevant for economic behavior as 
well as for well-being, as also are the promotion of trust, honesty, and thrift, McCleary 
and Barro (2006). From its roots in Weber, this literature has also enquired into whether 
different religions are more or less favorable to economic development, for example 
through attitudes to usury, Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2003), or through the 
promotion of social trust by developing relationships between coreligionists—
Protestantism—or less so by emphasizing relationships between worshippers and 
priests—Catholicism, see Helliwell and Putnam (2004).   
   9
3. The Gallup World Poll 
The World Poll is designed to be a continuing survey of all of the world’s citizens. It 
began in 2006, and I use the data from the first three waves, 2006, 2007, and 2008, by 
which time 145 countries have been included, of which 78 are in all three waves. The 145 
countries contained a total of 6.45 billion people in 2006, more than 98 percent of the 
population of the world. In each wave and in each country, the poll samples around 1,000 
individuals aged 15 and over, though in some cases the samples are smaller or larger. 
With only a few exceptions, the samples are random national samples of the target 
population. The poll uses an identical core questionnaire in all countries. Here I use two 
questions about religion (“Is religion an important part of your daily life?”) and religious 
observance (“Have you attended a place of worship or religious service within the last 
seven days?”); the second of these is potentially more problematic for religions (such as 
Buddhism) where attendance at places of worship is relatively unimportant. For short, I 
shall refer to these two questions as religiosity, and worship. 
  Gallup was unable to ask any of the religion questions in China, which is therefore 
excluded from the analysis. 
  The poll also collects information on health and on a number of health-related 
behaviors. Among the former, I look at self-reported health status, disability status, 
physical pain, and energy level. All of these are asked as yes or no questions. The 
wordings are (a) Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your personal health? (b) Do you 
have any health problems that prevent you from doing any of the things that people your 
age can normally do? (c) Did you experience the following feelings during a lot of the 
day yesterday? How about physical pain? (d) Did you have enough energy to get things   10
done yesterday?  (There are also a number of questions on life-evaluation, and on 
positive and negative affect, and there are the topics of a companion paper.) Among the 
social and personal health-related behaviors, I look at martial status, time spent with 
friends, whether the respondent has a friend who would provide support in time of 
trouble, and whether the respondent smoked yesterday. Finally, I look for links between 
religion and whether people have confidence in their country’s health and medical 
system; although this is neither a behavior nor an outcome, it is a health-related 
component of well-being. It may also reflect the provision of healthcare by religious 
institutions. 
  The poll also collects data on a set of socioeconomic and demographic variables, 
including education (coded into three categories—elementary education or less, 
secondary or up to three years of tertiary education, and four years or more of tertiary 
education) and a single question on income. The accuracy and meaningfulness of the 
income question is doubtful in much of the world and, unsurprisingly, there are a large 
number of missing values; even so, the question clearly contains some information, and 
we make some use of it, while acknowledging its problems. 
  Excluding China, and combining data from all waves, our sample contains 351,250 
observations from 144 countries; the sample size for each country ranges from (at the 
high end) 7,286 observations for India , 6,979 for Russia, and 5,238 for Germany to (at 
the low end) Puerto Rico (500), Guyana (501), and Belize (502). Only eight countries 
have less than a thousand observations. The poll includes countries that rarely appear in 
international surveys of any kind, including Afghanistan, Cuba, Iraq, and Myanmar, as 
well as 32 countries in Africa, including countries, such as Togo, Sierra Leone and   11
Zimbabwe, which  have the dubious distinction of having the lowest levels of life-
evaluation on the planet, Deaton (2008). Apart from the loss of China, the key religion 
variables are reported by nearly all of the respondents in the survey, so that we have 




4. Aging, income, education, and religiosity 
 
I begin with the cross-country patterns of religiosity summarized in the top panel of Table 
1. The first columns for each measure show that religiosity and worship vary greatly 
across the regions of the world. Africa is the base region in the table, and the average 
African country (not weighted by population) has 93 percent of its population religious, 
and 71 percent worshiping in the last week. South Asian and Middle Eastern countries 
are almost as religious, while the countries of non-English speaking Northern Europe and 
East Asia are the least religious, followed by the former communist countries of Eastern 
Europe. These patterns are only very partially explained by differences in national 
income; for example, East Asia and Northern Europe are the least religious places, but 
have very different income levels. In the second column for each measure income is 
included. Regional effects are not much changed, though income is important, at least for 
religiosity. The practice of religion, as measured through the worship variable, is not 
significantly affected by income, conditional on regional effects.  
  The history and spread of world religions gives good reason to suppose that the 
regional effects are fundamental, at least in part, and are unlikely to be readily explained 
by other standard variables. In fact, and apart from income, none of the other country   12
variables that I consider significantly predict religion conditional on the regions. Of 
course, the regions have very different levels of education and income, so that 
conditioning on regions absorbs much of the effect of income and education, and biases 
against finding evidence for the cross-country version of the secularization hypotheses. 
The bottom panel of the table shows what happens when the regional effects are 
excluded. Here, income is a great deal more important, both for religiosity and worship, 
though the coefficient on the latter is smaller. Average levels of education—as measured 
in the World Poll—are also associated with lower religiosity, and lower worship, and in 
this case, the effects are stronger for worship. I have also included a set of dummies for 
whether the majority religion in each country is Catholic, other Christian, or Muslim—
the base category is other religion—data taken from Fox and Sandler’s (2004) Religion 
and the State Project. These show that, conditional on national income educational levels, 
people in majority Muslim countries are more likely to report themselves to be religious, 
while people in majority Catholic countries are more likely to have worshiped in the last 
seven days. 
  Table 2 turns to within country analysis of the importance of religion. For each of up 
to 142 countries, I ran regressions of religiosity (as a 1/0 dichotomous variable for each 
individual) on a standard set of socio-demographic variables including, in all 
specifications, age, sex, and education. The country by country results are then averaged, 
without weights—so that each country is treated as an equally relevant observation—to 
give the numbers shown in the table. The standard errors are computed from the 
estimated variances for each country, under the assumption of independence over 
countries. I also included the logarithm of income and indicators of the individual’s place   13
of residence along a spectrum from rural to large city; because these variables are not 
available for all countries, we consider them as variants of the baseline specification. 
Because of the predictions about the different religiosity of men and women, one of the 
specifications, Model 2, interacts the age effects with sex. 
  The baseline specification, Model 1, shows that religiosity increases with age, that 
women are more religious than men, and that more educated people are less likely to be 
less religious. Model 3 shows, averaged over eight fewer countries, that people with 
higher incomes tend to be less religious, and that the income effect appears to operate in 
addition to the education effect, and largely independently of it, in the sense that the 
coefficients on education in Model 3 are very similar to those in Model 1. Model 4 shows 
that, as the religion as insurance theory suggests, rural or farming people are 2.8 
percentage points more likely to be religious, with people who live in villages or small 
towns intermediate between them and people who live in large cities or their suburbs. 
  The sex and age patterns in the averages hold for most countries of the world. Women 
are more religious than men in all but 14 of the 142 countries, and in only two of these, 
India and Guinea, is the negative coefficient on the female dummy more than twice its 
estimated standard error. Similarly, young people (the 15 to 19 year old group) are less 
religious than the elderly (70 and over) in all but 16 of the 142 countries, and the only 
cases where a positive coefficient is more than twice its standard error are Israel, Georgia, 
the Central African Republic, and Liberia. The Israeli case is particularly remarkable; 
controlling for sex and education, 15 to 19 year olds are 33 percentage points more likely 
to be religious than elderly Israelis, presumably because so many Israelis are immigrants, 
and because the younger immigrants are different than older immigrants.    14
  Model 2 allows the age profiles of religiosity to be different for men and women. 
Table 2 shows that the age profiles of religiosity for women are typically steeper so that 
the gap in religiosity between women and men, which is always positive, becomes more 
pronounced with age. Figure 1 looks at this phenomenon in more detail, showing age 
profiles of religiosity for women and for men for each of the World Bank’s four broad 
income groupings of countries, low income, low middle income, high middle income, 
and high income. Women are more religious than men at all ages in all four regions, but 
the gap is largest in the high and high-middle income countries, and smallest in the low 
income countries, many of which are in Africa. As we move from poor countries to rich 
countries, religiosity declines, and does so more for men than for women, so that the gap 
becomes larger. The religiosity gap between men and women increases with age, a 
finding that is much more pronounced in the richer countries.  
  I have also drawn the counterpart of Figure 1 but with worship (attended a religious 
service in the last seven days) replacing religiosity. Because the results are similar to 
Figure 1, the graphs are not shown here. The major differences are first, that worship, 
unlike religiosity, falls slightly in the highest age group—presumably because of the 
effect of infirmity on the ability to attend—second, that in the high income group, there is 
no difference in rates of worship for men and women under age 50, and third, the biggest 
gap between men and women is now much more clearly in the upper middle income 
countries.  
  Another way of looking at patterns of religiosity by age and sex is to divide the 
world, not by income groups, but by the majority religious grouping. This shows that the 
female male religion gap is confined to majority Christian counties—of course these are   15
also the richest countries in Figure 1—particularly majority Catholic countries. These 
findings are broadly consistent with the Miller and Hoffman risky behavior theory. The 
gender gap is largest in Christian countries, where there is a threat of damnation, and 
lower in the “other” group, which contains Buddhist, Hindu, Shinto countries, as well as 
Israel, where there is no such threat. The accumulation of sacral capital with age is also 
less rapid in those countries. The majority Muslim countries are something of an 
exception, but these are countries where very few people are not religious; indeed it is not 
entirely clear how to measure the size of the gap, as an absolute difference, as the ratio of 
religious men to religious women, or as the ratio of non-religious men to non-religious 
women.  
  Because we are working with what is essentially a single cross-section, we cannot tell 
whether the patterns in Figure 1 are age, cohort, or period effects, though we can try to 
interpret them according to each. The leading theory of age and gender effects is the 
wage theory of Azzi and Ehrenberg (1975), and this is consistent with most, although not 
all, of the evidence in the figure. The gender gap in religiosity is attributed to the wage 
gap, which is almost certainly lower in the poorest countries, particularly in Africa where 
women are often the main earners and providers. Religiosity is predicted to fall with 
rising wages, which is consistent with the pattern across regions. That religious capital 
should be accumulated at the end of life is predicted by the theory, and holds true for men 
and women in all four regions. The higher life expectancy in the richer countries is also 
consistent with the pronounced postponement of religiosity in the high income countries, 
and I investigate this further below. Particularly for men, religiosity is almost constant 
with age, picking up only after age 50. What is not consistent with the theory is the   16
steeper age profile for men; if men’s wages are higher than women’s wages, women 
should begin their process of accumulation earlier in life, and the gap between women 
and men should diminish with age, which is the opposite of what we see in these figures. 
  Rising religiosity with age is also consistent with secularization which would predict, 
even in the absence of age effects, that older people—who were born in an earlier, more 
religious time—will be more religious, even if their religiosity has not changed 
throughout their lives. In this sense, and as noted by Norris and Inglehart (2004) in their 
work with the World Values Survey, the age effects in the figure are consistent with 
secularization, simply as a function of time. One possible model of secularization is that 
religiosity decreases steadily over time in each country, but at different rates, and that the 
rate of secularization is slower for women than for men, say a fixed fraction less than 
unity of the rate of secularization for men. This predicts that women are uniformly more 
religious than men, and that religiosity increases with age in the cross-section for both 
men and women. It also predicts that the religiosity gap between the old and the young 
should be positively correlated with the religiosity gap between women and men, because 
both are driven by the same process of secularization, and by its different rates in each 
country. This prediction is strikingly evident in the data; the cross-country correlation 
between the religiosity gap between old and young (minus the coefficient on the youngest 
age group in Model 1 in Table 2) and the gap between women and men (the coefficient 
on female in Model 1) is 0.5 with a p–value of zero. Even so, this simple model is 
inconsistent with the rising age gaps in religiosity that we see in Figure 1, especially in 
the two richest groups of countries. The slower rate of secularization among women 
implies that the religiosity gap between men and women in the cross section should   17
narrow with age, not widen, as in the data. Put another way, widening with age implies 
that the religiosity gap was once larger than it is now, which seems implausible, 
particularly if the poorer countries now are any guide to what the richer countries once 
were. So neither the wage-based age-effect model, nor the simple secularization model is 
consistent with all of the evidence. In terms of the wage model, our results seem to imply 
that women attach a higher value to the afterlife than do men. 
  Another problem with the simple secularization story is that it appears to work too 
well, in the sense that there are too few exceptions. As noted above, it is only for Israel, 
the Central African Republic, Georgia, and Liberia that the old are significantly less 
religious than the young. Yet, there are many countries in the world where religiosity has 
risen over time, certainly in terms of the growing involvement of religion in politics, the 
greater religious orientation of many states, and the replacement of once secular states by 
states in which religion plays a greater role, see Shah and Toft (2009) who argue that 
“God is winning” in global politics, or Micklethwait and Wooldridge’s (2009) God is 
back. It is not only in the former communist countries that state hostility to religion has 
diminished. Shah and Toft note that the secularism of Ataturk’s Turkey, Nehru’s India, 
Nasser’s Egypt, and the Shah’s Iran, not to mention Saddam Hussein’s Iraq, have 
weakened in favor of states where religion’s role in politics is much larger, and they note 
that in other countries, the liberalization and democratization of politics has brought 
increases in the importance of religion in public life. They cite Mexico, Nigeria, Turkey, 
Indonesia, India, and the United States as examples. Of the four countries with a 
significantly negative age gradient, only Georgia obviously fits this pattern. In the US, 
15-19 year olds are more than 37 percentage points less likely to be religious than those   18
aged 70 and older (controlling for sex, sex-age interactions, and education). In Iran, the 
15-19 year olds are 15 percentage points less likely to be religious than the 70 plus group, 
and those in their 20s are more than 25 percentage points less religious. In Mexico, the 
youngest group is 40 points less religious than the oldest group. In Egypt, the age profile 
is essentially flat, and the same is true in Turkey, India, Indonesia, and Nigeria. In Iraq, 
the young are more religious, and almost significantly so. Of course, the greater 
involvement of religion in politics could occur without people becoming more religious, 
for example if greater democracy leads to a fuller expression of pre-existing views in 
public life. 
 Risk-taking  theory  offers  a partial account of the high cross-country correlation 
between the age and gender gaps in religiosity. Suppose that, for some unspecified 
reason, there are international differences in the degree of risk taking by young men. 
Countries with high risk taking would then have both a large gender gap and a large age 
gap. If true, this would yield a single explanation for both phenomena. 
  In an effort to explain the age and gender gaps in religiosity, I have run a series of 
“upper-stage” cross-country regressions using the within-country estimated coefficients 
as dependent variables. The first column of Table 3 show a regression of the age 
religiosity gap, estimated from Model 1 in Table 2, on indicators for the World Bank 
income groups, on indicators for the major religion of each country, on the average rate 
of GDP growth of the country (measured over as many years as are available in the Penn 
World Table), on life expectancy at birth in 2000, and on the fertility rate in 2006. This 
age religiosity gap is the coefficient on the dummy for the 15 to 19 year old age group in 
a regression where the omitted group is 70 years old and older, so it is typically a   19
negative number measuring the difference in religiosity between the young and the old. 
The second column presents the same regressions for the coefficient on the female 
dummy in the same regression, a measure of how much more religious are women than 
men, controlling for age and education. 
  The first column provides some evidence in favor of the Azzi and Ehrenberg 
interpretation of religiosity and age and against the secularization story. On the latter, the 
age gap in religiosity is not related to past economic growth in the country, as it should be 
if it is growth in national income (or more widely, modernization) that is driving the 
decline in religion. On the former, the age gap is negatively related to life expectancy, 
which is what would be expected if longer lives make is less important to become 
religious earlier. The contrast between the two findings is explored further in Figures 3 
and 4, which split up the results by income group. Figure 3 shows at least some evidence 
that, within the income groups, the age religiosity gap is larger where life-expectancy is 
higher. It is only in the high income countries that this is not true, but even they, as a 
group, lie in the appropriate position on the general regression line. Figure 4 shows that 
there is no such pattern for the rate of economic growth; in particular it is not true that 
economic growth drives secularization in the richer countries but not in the poorer ones. 
These results are hardly conclusive, but the evidence leans towards the age-effects 
hypothesis, and is consistent with the accumulation of capital for the hereafter, and leans 
against the cohort-effects secularization hypothesis, at least if secularization is driven by 
modernization as represented by increasing per capita GDP. Note also from the first 
column of Table 3 that the patterns of aging and religiosity do not appear to be different 
across the different majority religions.   20
  Table 3 also shows a regression of the female religiosity effect on income group, on 
major religion, on life expectancy and on growth. In contrast to the age regression, life 
expectancy has no effect on the differential religiosity of men and women. There is a 
mild and barely significant growth effect—economic growth actually widens the gap 
between men and women—and a marginally significant effect of the income group 
dummies—the gap is widest in the upper middle income countries. The major effect here 
is the one that we have already seen in Figure 2, that the greater religiosity of women is 
most pronounced in the majority Christian countries and much less pronounced 
elsewhere, as picked up by the negative dummies. 
  I have also experimented with adding fertility rates to the regressions in Table 3. The 
age gap in religiosity is strongly positively associated with fertility and fertility is now the 
only variable that is significant. Fertility is negatively associated with the gender age gap, 
so that conditional on income group (now not significant) and majority religion 
(significant), the gender gap is highest in the low fertility countries, which is inconsistent 
with the view that the greater religiosity of women is associated with childbearing, or that 
it occurs in societies where women’s primary role is childbearing. The obvious issue here 
is reverse causality, that religiosity is driving fertility, not the other way round. Given the 
results in the literature, and those in the next section, that is also an issue for life 
expectancy, but surely a good deal less so. On a religion to fertility interpretation, fertility 
depends on the young being relatively religious, and on men being relatively religious. 
Further exploration of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper. 
  Table 2 shows that, averaged over countries, the richer and better educated people 
within each country are less likely to be religious. If income and education are essential   21
ingredients in “development,” these within-country results can help us understand 
secularization with development over time. They are also consistent with Hume’s view of 
religion as a superstition that is dispelled by education, and Mill’s argument that higher 
incomes induce substitution of present for future pleasures. But in contrast to the effects 
of sex and age, the signs of these income and education effects are far from uniform 
across countries. In Model 1, where income is excluded and there are 142 countries, in 58 
the coefficient on high school is positive; and in Model 3, where both income and 
education are included for 132 countries, in 52 the coefficient on income is positive. Most 
of these are countries where average religiosity is high, but they also include (for 
education) Holland, New Zealand, Finland, and Ireland, and for income, India, Pakistan, 
Latvia, and Lithuania. In these data, unlike some reported in the literature, the US shows 
(insignificant) negative effects of education and income on (this measure of) religiosity. 
The diversity of these results around the world speaks against any universal account of 
secularization through better education and rising incomes. It is also consistent with the 
relatively muted role of income and education in the cross-section of countries in Table 1. 
  Heterogeneity also characterizes the results for whether rural people are more 
religious than urban people. In a diverse group of 43 of the 125 countries for which we 
have data, the coefficient on rural residence is negative, and significantly so for Tanzania, 
Ghana, Benin, Georgia, Estonia, Guinea, Latvia, and Togo. Apart from age and sex, the 
fundamental drivers of secularization are hardly well-understood, at least if we are 
looking for explanations that hold universally (or near universally) across the globe.  
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5. What does religiosity do for health? 
I turn now to the correlations between religion and health and health-relevant behaviors. 
My procedure is essentially the same as before. For each country, and for each of ten 
outcomes, I run a regression of the outcome on a set of age dummies, on two education 
group dummies, on a dummy for female, on a dummy for religiosity, and on a dummy for 
the interaction between female and religiosity. At a second stage, I also add interactions 
between the religiosity dummy and the age dummies in order to explore whether the 
effects of religiosity vary by age. 
  Table 4, for health outcomes and Table 5, for health-related measures, show the 
results. An overall summary of these results is that, controlling for age, education, and 
sex, religion is generally beneficial for health and for health-related personal and social 
behaviors. The word “generally” refers to the average over the countries for which we 
have data, and that there are always exceptions, so that for some of the outcome 
measures, there are almost as many countries where the partial correlation with health is 
negative as there are countries where the partial correlation is positive. The results also 
show that “generally” holds more often for men than for women, for whom the health 
benefits of religion are often markedly smaller. Indeed, these are among the main results 
of this paper, that the beneficial effects of religiosity on health are far from universally 
apparent. Even so, there are some patterns that are standard across many countries. Men 
who report that religion is important in their lives are consistently more likely to be 
married—in 105 out of 142 countries, they are more likely to report that they were treated 
with respect all day yesterday—112 out of 142 countries, they are less likely to have 
smoked on the day before the interview—in 70 out of 85 countries, and they are more   23
likely to trust the health and medical system—in 101 out of 132 countries. Yet the 
increased prevalence of marriage, of being treated with respect, of being a non-smoker, 
and of trusting the medical system are markedly less for women than for men. The 
average coefficient on the interaction of female and religiosity has the opposite sign to 
that coefficient on religiosity though it is smaller in absolute magnitude, so the 
differences between religious and non-religious women (the sum of the religiosity and 
interaction coefficients) are smaller than the differences between religious and non-
religious men (the coefficient on religiosity.) 
  In more detail, Table 4 shows that, averaged over countries, religious people report 
that they have more energy, and are more likely to be satisfied with their personal health. 
For both of these outcomes, there is a good deal of heterogeneity across countries; for 
energy and health satisfaction, the balance is about two-thirds favorable to one-third 
unfavorable.  
  For pain and health satisfaction, men and women are different. As is often found in 
the literature, women are consistently more likely than men to report pain (by 1.1 
percentage points), to report less energy (by 3.6 percentage points), to report 
dissatisfaction with their personal health (by 1.6 percentage points), and to report that 
they are disabled (by 2.0 percentage points). But although religious men are on average in 
better health than non-religious men, the same is not true of women. To compare 
religious and non-religious women, add the first and third coefficients in each cell of the 
first column, and this shows that there is no health benefit for religiosity for women in 
either pain or self-reported health status, while religious women are actually more likely   24
than non-religious women to report disability. Again, it should be emphasized that there 
is much international heterogeneity in these results. 
  Table 5 shows the results for outcomes or behaviors that affect health, or have been 
frequently linked to health in the literature. They vary from clear examples like cigarette 
smoking, to somewhat less clear cases, such as marriage, which almost always appears as 
a positive correlate of health, to social capital variables, such as time spent socially with 
friends and relatives, whether there is a friend or relative who would help in time of need, 
and whether the respondent is treated with respect. I also include whether the respondent 
has confidence in the health or medical system; this is hardly a health outcome variable, 
though it is surely a positive factor in people’s lives, and the religion-based provision of 
healthcare is one of the mechanisms through which religion can affect health..  
  There is no partial correlation between religiosity and social time, but religiosity is 
estimated to be a positive force for the other five categories. The benefits of religion are 
particularly significant and likely to be universal across countries for marriage, for being 
treated with respect, for smoking, and for trusting the healthcare system. This last may 
well reflect the role of religious organizations in providing healthcare in much of the 
world. However, it is notable that these are benefits for religious over non-religious men, 
and they are typically smaller—and sometimes even non-existent—between religious and 
non-religious women. Religious women are no more likely to be married than non-
religious women, which echoes the effect on health of marriage itself, where the literature 
often finds health benefits for men but not women, see for example Elo and Preston 
(1996). For being treated with respect, trust in the healthcare system, and smoking, the 
coefficient on the interaction between female and religiosity is of the opposite sign to the   25
coefficient on religiosity, so that the benefits of religiosity among women are smaller 
than those among men, but remain positive. Note the very large main effect of being 
female on smoking, over the 85 countries for which we have data, women are 23 
percentage points less likely to smoke than men. 
  Figures 5 through 8 provide further disaggregation of these results, focusing on the 
cases where religiosity has an effect that varies by age or by income group. In the 
regressions underlying these graphs, religiosity is fully interacted with the age groups, so 
that I am allowing different age patterns for the religious and non-religious. I then 
average the coefficients over the four World Bank income groups, and plot the outcome 
by age for religious and non-religious people separately. Drawing the graphs this way 
may suggest that people are either religious or non-religious throughout their lives, which 
will not be true if there is an age effect in religiosity as I have argued in the previous 
section. Note also that the graphs are drawn for men; the curves for women are those for 
men displaced by a constant vertical amount. In some cases, such as pain, this will 
change the relative position of the religious and non-religious groups. 
  Figures 5, 6, and 7 are broadly similar. Pain decreases and energy and health 
satisfaction increase as we move from the low income to the high income countries. In 
the low income group, religion is protective, but there is little or no effect in the other 
three groups. Religious people have more energy and more health satisfaction in the low 
income and lower middle income groups, but do no better in the upper income or high 
income countries. Religious people are more likely to be treated with respect throughout 
the income regions of the world though, Figure 8, and once again, the size of the effect is 
largest in the poorest countries. Remarkably, there is a steady increase in being treated   26
with respect with country income; higher income comes with better health, and better 
relationships between people, an important aspect of greater freedom. Finally, Figure 9 
shows that religious people smoke less throughout the world, and at all ages. For 
smoking, rates are lowest in the rich world—presumably because people are more likely 
to understand the health risks—and highest in the middle income countries—presumably 
because of the combination of relatively high income and still relatively low health 
awareness. But everywhere, religion is protective of health through its inhibiting the use 
of tobacco. This is perhaps the clearest example of a link between religion and self-
control. 
  For the other outcomes in Tables 4 and 5, disability, marriage, having a friend in time 
of need, time spent with friends, and trust in the healthcare or medical system, the 
disaggregation by income group and age adds nothing to what we already know because 
the effects are either absent or similar by age and income group. I have also run 
regressions of the coefficients on religiosity against dummies for country income group 
and for the majority religion in each country. In all but three cases, these add nothing to 
the results already presented. The three cases where there are significant effects of 
majority religion are self-reported health status, being treated with respect, and having a 
friend in time of need, all of which are significantly higher in majority Muslim countries 
than would be predicted by the country’s income group. 
  None of Figures 5 through 9 shows notable effects of interactions between religiosity 
and age. The estimated effects of religiosity on health and health related outcomes are 
similar at all ages, at least as far as can be seen in these data. Of course, as shown in the   27
previous section, religiosity itself rises with age so that the importance of the protective 
effects of religion also rises with age, simply because of its greater prevalence. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This paper has presented a largely descriptive analysis of patterns of aging, gender, 
religiosity and health throughout the world. In the vast majority of the countries of the 
world, women are more religious than men, and the elderly are more religious than the 
young. These two phenomena are related in that the difference in religiosity between men 
and women is strongly positively correlated with the difference in religiosity between the 
young and the old. It is difficult to separate out age from cohort effects, but at least some 
of the evidence is consistent with pure age effect that are roughly consistent with rational 
choice theory, that religion should be postponed until late in life, that lower wages 
promote religiosity, and that the acquisition of religion can be postponed when life is 
longer. There is no obvious link between long-term income growth and the gap in 
religiosity between young and old, which is contrary to income-driven secularization. 
The gap in religiosity between men and women is not easily explained, and remains 
controversial in the literature, but both the wage and risk-taking theories are consistent 
with at least some of the global evidence.   
  I also find that, at least on average, over all countries, and over countries sorted into 
income groups, religious people do better on a number of health and health-related 
indicators. These protective effects appear to be stronger the poorer is the country—as 
suggested by Inglehart (2008), religion is a route to a better life in poor countries, but not   28
in rich ones—and to protect men more than women, though this hypothesis requires more 
extensive investigation.  
  None of the results show that the health benefits of religion can be obtained simply by 
joining a church, or even by undertaking a serious conversion. People who are religious 
are almost certainly different from non-religious people in ways that go beyond their 
religiosity and beyond the basic educational and demographic controls that are used here. 
Even so, some of the correlations presented here are remarkably universal across the 
religions and countries of the world, and need to explained and better understood.  
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Note: The dependent variables in these regressions are the fractions of people in each country 
who report that religion is important in their lives and the fraction of people who attended a place 
of worship in the last week. In the top panel, the first regression contains only regional dummies, 
the second regional dummies plus the logarithm of GDP per capita. In the bottom panel, regional 
dummies are excluded. For education, high school is the proportion of the population who have 
more than elementary education but less than or equal to three years of college, college is the 
fraction with more than three years of tertiary education, and the omitted category is the fraction 
who completed elementary education or less. The education variables are calculated from the 
World Poll. The last three variables come from the Fox-Sandler religion and the state project and 
are dummies for majority religion Catholic, other Christian, Muslim, and other, which is the 
omitted category.   32
Table 2: Averages of estimated coefficients from country by country regressions 
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Notes: These numbers are based on individual level regressions for up to 142 countries. The dependent 
variable is a 1/0 depending on whether the individual reports that religion is important in their lives. The 
right hand side variables are a set of age dummies, as shown, with the omitted category people aged 70 or 
above, a dummy for gender, the logarithm of family income, dummies for education, where the omitted 
category indicates that the individual completed elementary education or less, and dummies for location, 
which are (a) rural or on a farm, (b) in a village or small town, (c) in the suburbs of a city, and (d) in a large 
city, which is the omitted category. In Model 2, the age dummies are interacted with the gender dummy. 
Not all countries have all categories so the number of countries, shown in the last row, varies from model to 
model. 
 
 Table 3: Cross country regressions of within-country age and sex effects
Age religiosity gap
      (Young relative to old)
Female religiosity gap














































Notes: The dependent variable in the first regression is the estimated coefficient in the religiosity regression of the
age-dummy for 15–19 year olds relative to those aged 70 and older. There are 130 countries in the regression. The
F–statistics for the three income groups is 0.51, and for the three majority religion groups is 1.33. Average GDP
growth comes from chained real GDP per capita in the Penn World Table, and is calculated over the longest span
available for each country. The dependent variable in the second regression is the estimated coefficient in the
religiosity regression of the female dummy. There are again 130 countries, and the F–statistics are 3.47 for the
income groups and 14.22 for the majority religion groups 









































































Notes: The four questions  are for pain “did you experience the following feelings during a lot of the day yesterday?
How about physical pain?”, for energy, “did you have enough energy to get things done yesterday?”, for satisfied
with health, “are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your personal health,” and for disabled, “do you have any health
problems that prevent you from doing any of the things that people your age can normally do?” All are dichotomous,
with yes coded 1, and no coded 0. The third column shows the number of countries for which the World Poll asked
the question, and the fourth column the percentage of countries for which the estimated coefficient is the same sign
as the mean shown in the first column. In each country with data, I ran a regression of each outcome on a set of six
age-group dummies, on dummies for educational status, and on religiosity, female, and the interaction of female and
religiosity. The first column is the (unweighted( mean across countries of the last three coefficients. The t–value tests
that this global mean is zero, and is calculated from the estimated variances of the individual regressions. 












































































































Notes: See Table 4 notes for procedures. The six outcomes analyzed here are defined as follows. Married refers to
current marital status, and is defined as 1 if current status is married, and 0 for all other responses, including single,
never married, separated, divorced, widowed, or domestic partner. Friend in need is 1 if the respondent answers yes
to the question “if you were in trouble, do you have relatives or friends you can count on to help you whenever you
need them?” Treated with respect is yes if the respondent says he or she was treated with respect all day yesterday.
Time with friends is the answer to “Approximately, how many hours did you spend, socially, with friends or family
yesterday?” The interview is instructed to include e-mail or telephone time. This is the only one of the left-hand side
variables that is not dichotomous. Smoker is 1 if the respondent said yes to “did you smoke yesterday?” Trust
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Figure 9: Smoking by religiosity, age, and country income level 